The Destiny of Clean Energy: Legality of the EPA\u27s Clean Power Plan with Respect to Emissions Trading by Helton, Samuel H.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Volume 17
Issue 5 Online Issue Article 2
5-1-2016
The Destiny of Clean Energy: Legality of the EPA's
Clean Power Plan with Respect to Emissions
Trading
Samuel H. Helton
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt
Part of the Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samuel H. Helton, The Destiny of Clean Energy: Legality of the EPA's Clean Power Plan with Respect to Emissions Trading, 17 N.C. J.L. &
Tech. On. 43 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol17/iss5/2
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 43 (2016) 
 43 
THE DESTINY OF CLEAN ENERGY: LEGALITY OF THE EPA’S 
CLEAN POWER PLAN WITH RESPECT TO EMISSIONS TRADING 
Samuel H. Helton* 
Cleaner energy is necessary to avoid significant health and 
climate risks in the future, and no energy is dirtier than our 
nation’s fossil-fuel burning power plants. The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) Clean Power Plan 
seeks to address the hazards posed by the electricity sector, and 
proposes carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions trading as an 
efficient, cost-effective option to do so. This Recent Development 
argues that the Clean Power Plan should be upheld with respect to 
emissions trading. First, a reasonable interpretation of section 
111(d) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) provides a legal basis for 
carbon dioxide emissions trading. Second, a thorough analysis of 
North Carolina’s legislative history provides an example of why 
carbon dioxide emissions trading is legal without authorization 
from state general assemblies. Further, emissions trading allows 
for easier Clean Power Plan compliance by power plants. The 
EPA should be granted the deference to set emissions trading as a 
valid compliance option. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a future with significantly fewer premature deaths, 
heart attacks, asthma attacks, and hospitalizations each year. 
Transitioning to cleaner energy sources can realize this future, 
along with several other global health and climate benefits, by 
                                                
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2017. The 
author would like to thank the NC JOLT staff and editors for their assistance 
with this Recent Development, particularly Collette Corser, Chelsea 
Weiermiller, Cameron Neal, and Charlotte Davis. The author would also like to 
thank Jonas Monast of the Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions 
and Victor Flatt of the UNC Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation, and 
Resources for their suggestions. 
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reducing the emission of harmful air pollutants.1 Greenhouse gas 
pollution threatens the United States, and the world, because it 
creates long-lasting and damaging impacts on our climate, which 
negatively affect public health and the environment.2 CO2 is the 
most widespread greenhouse gas (“GHG”) pollutant, accounting 
for nearly seventy-five percent of global GHG emissions and 
eighty-two percent of total U.S. GHG emissions.3 The largest 
source of CO2 emissions are power plants, accounting for thirty-
one percent of total U.S. GHG emissions.4 On August 3, 2015, 
President Obama announced the EPA’s release of the final version 
of the Clean Power Plan.5 The rule, created under section 111(d) of 
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), is meant “to protect human health and 
the environment by reducing CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-fired 
power plants in the U.S.”6 By 2030, the Clean Power Plan aims to 
achieve CO2 emission reductions of approximately thirty-two 
percent from CO2 emissions levels in 2005.7 However, many states 
and organizations disapprove of the plan and will likely challenge 
the legality of the plan in court.8 According to Environment and 
                                                
 1 See generally FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Benefits of a Cleaner, More 
Efficient Power Sector, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-benefits.pdf (last updated Aug. 13, 
2015) (discussing the health and climate benefits realized by the Clean Power 
Plan by shifting to cleaner energy). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. 
 5 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64661 (Oct. 23, 
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan Final 
Rule], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-
22842.pdf. 
 6 See id. at 64664. 
 7 See id. at 64665. 
 8 See, e.g., Andrew Harris, Obama, EPA Defend Clean Power Plan Against 
States’ Challenge, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Aug. 31, 2015, 6:04 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-31/obama-epa-defend-clean-
power-plan-against-states-challenge (explaining that fifteen states, led by West 
Virginia, asked a federal court in Washington to delay the Clean Power Plan); 
Q&A: EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Power Plants, 
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Energy Publishing, the leading source for comprehensive, daily 
coverage of environmental and energy policy and markets, “Less 
than 12 hours from when President Obama’s landmark regulations 
for power plants were published in the Federal Register, it became 
the most heavily litigated environmental regulation ever and 
seemingly destined for the Supreme Court.”9 
Among the several potential targets for litigation,10 the legality 
of emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan will be heavily 
                                                                                                         
CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/federal/ 
executive/epa/q-a-regulation-greenhouse-gases-existing-power (last visited Nov. 
6, 2015) (stating that a number of states have already brought legal actions 
challenging the Clean Power Plan, and several more will most likely join their 
effort); Reuters, Fifteen US states seek to block Obama’s clean power plan, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2015, 5:42 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2015/aug/14/fifteen-us-states-seek-block-obamas-clean-power-plan 
(stating that fifteen state attorneys general petitioned a federal court in 
Washington to block the Clean Power Plan); Davide Savenije, 15 states launch 
legal battle against EPA’s Clean Power Plan, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/15-states-launch-legal-battle-against-epas-clean-
power-plan/404105/. Fifteen states have filed a petition for an emergency stay 
with the U.S. Court of Appeals against the Clean Power Plan.  Id. The states are 
arguing that the EPA cannot regulate an emissions source under 111(d) if it is 
already regulated under section 112, and that the EPA can only regulate 
emissions at the smokestack and may not implement anything “outside the 
fenceline”. Id.; Samantha Page, 16 States Think The EPA’s Emissions Rule Isn’t 
Legal And They Shouldn’t Have To Comply, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 6, 2015, 
1:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/08/06/3688652/first-shot-at-
finalized-clean-power-plan-arrives/ (discussing how sixteen states had already 
formally requested an administrative stay of the Clean Power Plan less than a 
week after its release). 
 9 Legal Challenges – Overview & Documents, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (2015), 
http://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal. 
 10 See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, The Clean Power Plan Will Survive: Part 1, 
LAW 360 (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/704046/the-clean-
power-plan-will-survive-part-1 (providing that four prominent legal targets of 
the Clean Power Plan are: (1) whether the CAA section 111(b) rule setting 
carbon standards for new and modified power plants, which is the precondition 
of section 111(d), is valid; (2) whether section 111(d) is even enforceable after 
the two separate versions passed from the House and Senate; (3) whether the 
EPA can implement “beyond the fenceline” options, such as emissions trading; 
and (4) whether the Clean Power Plan violates the Tenth Amendment); Keith 
 
17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 43, 46 
Legality of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan and Emissions Trading 
scrutinized.11 Those opposing the plan believe that section 111(d) 
of the CAA offers no legal authority for an emissions trading 
program.12 Furthermore, opposing parties insist that state 
legislation authorizing CO2 emissions trading is required, even if a 
trading program is found to be legal under the federal plan.13 
                                                                                                         
Goldberg, Legal Eagles Question EPA Authority For Clean Power Plan, LAW 
360 (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/631957/legal-eagles-
question-epa-authority-for-clean-power-plan (discussing two additional 
challenges to the Clean Power Plan: (1) that utilities regulated under CAA 
section 112 cannot be regulated under Section 111(d); and (2) that the Clean 
Power Plan violates the sovereignty of the states under the Fifth and Tenth 
Amendments). 
 11 See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, A Quick Legal FAQ on EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (July 14, 2015), http://www.rff.org/blog/ 
2015/quick-legal-faq-epa-s-clean-power-plan (stating that the emissions trading 
is one of the four main legal risks of the Clean Power Plan); William W. Buzbee 
et al., The Clean Power Plan: Issues to Watch, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM 57–58 (Aug. 2015), http://progressivereform.org/articles/CPP_1506.pdf 
(acknowledging that emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan will be a 
legal issue, but arguing in support of an emissions trading program). 
 12 See, e.g., Joe Koncelik, Clean Power Plan – An Ambitious Plan with 
Serious Legal Issues, OHIO ENVTL. L. BLOG (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://www.ohioenvironmentallawblog.com/2015/08/articles/climate-change/ 
clean-power-plan-an-ambitious-plan-with-serious-legal-issues/ (describing how 
opponents of the plan argue that section 111(d) is limited to requiring certain 
technologies to be installed at the power plants themselves, and doesn’t allow 
for outside reductions, such as an emissions trading program); Nathan 
Richardson, A Quick Legal FAQ on EPA’s Clean Power Plan, RESOURCES FOR 
THE FUTURE (July 14, 2015), http://www.rff.org/blog/2015/quick-legal-faq-epa-
s-clean-power-plan (stating that section 111(d) does not explicitly allow 
trading). 
 13 See, e.g., Craig Gannett, Implementing Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: 
The Pathway to Regional Cap-And-Trade Programs?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. 
L. FOUND. SPECIAL INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE L. & REG. 12 (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://www.dwt.com/files/Publication/564b041d-5bbe-4167-b8e6-c17233b67198/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/85c4e92a-492b-4de7-9144-c1bfd55a6f0b/Ga 
nnett%20Regional%20Cap%20%20Trade%20Paper%201-15.pdf (suggesting the 
need for state legislation authorizing the participation of state clean air 
regulators in a regional emissions trading organization); Multistate Coordination 
Resources for Clean Power Plan Compliance: Sample Documents for 
Consideration, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY 
COMMISSIONERS 19 (June 2015), http://www.naruc.org/Grants/Documents/ 
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This Recent Development argues that there are several reasons 
that the Clean Power Plan should be upheld with respect to 
emissions trading, and explains why CO2 emissions trading is legal 
without authorization from state general assemblies. Part II 
discusses the legislative authority behind the Clean Power Plan, 
how states can comply, and the concept behind CO2 emissions 
trading. Part III assesses the legality of the Clean Power Plan’s 
CO2 emissions trading program and describes how it is a key 
component in state compliance. Finally, Part IV concludes by 
illustrating that authorization from state general assemblies is 
unnecessary for states to legally implement an emissions trading 
program, using North Carolina as an example. 
II.  THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: AUTHORITY, COMPLIANCE, 
AND EMISSIONS TRADING 
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan has two main objectives.14 The 
first is to establish guidelines that reflect both the unique way in 
which the power system operates, and the actions, strategies, and 
policies that states and utilities have already undertaken to reduce 
CO2 emissions.15 The United States’ power system is an 
interconnected, interdependent, and complex network of power 
plants and transformers connected by thousands of miles of high-
voltage transmission lines.16 Several states and utilities have 
already incorporated on-site power plant technologies, or have 
participated in regional emissions trading programs to reduce their 
CO2 emissions.17 The plan’s second objective is to provide states 
                                                                                                         
Multistate%20111d-Coordination-FINAL%20_June2015.pdf (stating that a 
common theme among opposing states is that authorizing state legislation is 
necessary for state plans, or parts thereof, such as an emissions trading 
program). 
 14 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64665. 
 15 See id. 
 16 Top 9 Things You Didn’t Know About America’s Power Grid, DEPT. OF 
ENERGY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://energy.gov/articles/top-9-things-you-didnt-
know-about-americas-power-grid. 
 17 See, e.g., New Natural Gas Generation: Project Overview, DUKE ENERGY 
(2015), https://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/natural-gas-overview.asp 
(discussing how Duke Energy retired three coal-fired power plants and 
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and utilities with a number of compliance options and significant 
flexibility in how they achieve their assigned emissions goals.18 
The CAA provides the statutory authority for the state 
implementation plans (“SIPs”) used to meet these two objectives. 
This section discusses the basis of the Clean Power Plan by 
focusing on: (A) the statutory authority from which the plan was 
created, (B) the options for state compliance under the plan, and 
(C) the role of CO2 emissions trading for state compliance. 
A.  Statutory Authority 
The EPA created the Clean Power Plan pursuant to section 
111(d) of the federal CAA,19 which gives the EPA authority to 
regulate emissions of air pollutants from existing sources by 
requiring states to adopt emissions “standards of performance” for 
those sources.20 The regulations created under section 111(d) 
should establish a procedure similar to CAA section 110,21 which 
requires the state in question to adopt a SIP and submit that plan to 
the Administrator of the EPA and discusses the necessary contents 
to be included within the plan.22 The EPA shall require the SIPs 
created and submitted to the Administrator under section 111(d) to 
establish “standards of performance” for any existing source for 
any air pollutant for which air quality criteria have not been issued 
under CAA sections 108(a) or 112(b), but to which a “standard of 
performance” would apply if such existing source were a new 
                                                                                                         
implemented five natural gas-fired power plants in order to significantly reduce 
harmful emissions while greatly increasing electricity generating capacity); 
Welcome, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2015), http://www.rggi.org/ 
(discussing how RGGI, a cooperative among nine northeastern states, is the first 
market-based program in the United States to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
through regional cap and trade). 
 18 Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64665. The plan discusses 
several potential compliance options for states to meet their emissions goals, and 
leaves significant flexibility to the states in deciding which compliance options 
to use. For further discussion see infra notes 41–68. 
 19 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64663. 
 20 See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015). 
 21 Id. § 7410(a) (2015). 
 22 See id. 
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source under CAA section 111(b).23 “Standard of performance” is 
defined as “a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects 
the degree of emission limitation achievable through the 
application of the best system of emission reduction [(“BSER”)] 
which . . . the Administrator determines has been adequately 
demonstrated.”24 This process of regulating under section 111(d) is 
explained through three steps.25 
First, the EPA releases “guideline documents” that identify 
different systems for reducing emissions and determine the BSER 
for the pollutant being regulated, in this case CO2.26 The BSER 
must be adequately demonstrated through consideration of cost, 
energy requirements, and environmental impacts.27 Furthermore, 
the guideline documents have emissions criteria indicating the 
level of emissions reduction achievable through implementation of 
the BSER.28 Second, as discussed above, each state creates a SIP 
establishing a standard of performance and discussing how that 
standard will be implemented and enforced.29 It is important to 
note that states play a significant role under section 111(d).30 It is 
the states, not the EPA, that create the standards of performance 
and determine how the sources within state borders will meet those 
standards.31 The EPA’s guidance is only to serve as a reference for 
the states in making their decisions.32 Lastly, each state submits 
their Section 111(d) SIP to the EPA for approval based on whether 
                                                
 23 Id. § 7411(d) (2015). 
 24 Id. § 7411(a)(1) (2015). 
 25 See Jeremy M. Tarr, Jonas Monast & Tim Profeta, Regulating Carbon 
Dioxide under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, NICHOLAS INSTITUTE FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE UNIVERSITY, NI R 13-01 1, 6 (Jan. 
2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_r_13-
01.pdf (discussing the background and process for regulating under section 
111(d) of the CAA). 
 26 See id. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. For further detail on the second step see supra notes 22–26. 
 30 See id. at 7. 
 31 See Tarr et al., supra note 25, at 7. 
 32 See id. 
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the SIP satisfies the baseline criteria required by EPA’s 
guidelines.33 If a state fails to submit a plan or submits a plan that 
the EPA determines does not meet the basic criteria laid out in the 
guidelines, the EPA may develop a federal implementation plan34 
and apply it to the state.35 
Using the statutory authority of section 111(d), the EPA 
determined the BSER for CO2 under the Clean Power Plan to 
include three “building blocks”: (1) heat rate improvements at 
affected coal-fired steam electric generating units (“EGUs”), 
(2) substituting lower-emitting natural gas combined cycle units 
for reduced generation from higher-emitting affected steam 
generating units, and (3) substituting increased generation from 
new zero-emitting renewable energy generating capacity for 
reduced generation from affected fossil fuel-fired generating 
units.36 Building block one is designed to improve the efficiency of 
burning coal resulting in fewer CO2 emissions from coal-fired 
power plants.37 Building block two simply means replacing coal-
fired power plants with natural gas combined cycle power plants.38 
Building block three suggests incorporating more renewables 
while preserving existing and under-construction nuclear power 
plants.39 These three building blocks are approaches available to all 
affected EGUs for achieving state compliance; however, 
                                                
 33 See id. 
 34 See, e.g., Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From 
Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; 
Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations; Proposed Rule, 
80 Fed. Reg. 64966 (Oct. 23, 2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/FR-2015-10-23/pdf/2015-22848.pdf. 
 35 See Tarr et al., supra note 25, at 7. 
 36 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64667. 
 37 See Jonathan L. Ramseur & James E. McCarthy, EPA’s Clean Power Plan: 
Highlights of the Final Rule, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R44145 
CRS Report 1, 5 (Aug. 14, 2015), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R44145.pdf. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. 
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compliance is not strictly limited to these three approaches.40 The 
next section of this Recent Development explains how states will 
comply with the mandatory baseline requirements of the Clean 
Power Plan. 
B.  State Compliance 
The Clean Power Plan requires states to submit to the EPA 
either an initial or final SIP by September 6, 2016.41 States 
submitting an initial plan can request a two-year extension from 
the EPA to submit their final plan by September 6, 2018.42 
However, states granted the extensions are required to submit plan 
progress reports by September 6, 2017.43 As for the structure of 
state compliance plans, the Clean Power Plan presents two types of 
SIPs for states to choose from: (1) an “emissions standards” 
approach, or (2) a “state measures” approach.44 An emissions 
standards SIP approach would implement the federally enforceable 
emission rate standards45 directly at the EGUs in the state.46 This 
type of plan could involve multiple states and include an emission 
rate trading system or a mass-based trading system.47 In contrast, a 
state measures SIP approach would allow states to achieve the 
                                                
 40 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64667; see also David 
Doniger, Understanding the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, SWITCHBOARD: 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ddoniger/understanding_the_epas_clean_p.html 
(discussing how emissions trading and energy efficiency are two of the most 
prominent compliance options that are not included within the Clean Power Plan 
Final Rule’s three building blocks). 
 41 See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 2. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64709; see also The Role of 
States: States Decide How To Meet Their Goal, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 
2015), http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/fs-cpp-states-decide.pdf (discussing 
how states can choose which type of SIP they want to submit to the EPA). 
 45 For further explanation of the emission rate standards, see infra notes 49–
61. 
 46 See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 2. 
 47 See id. For further discussion of emission rate and mass-based trading 
systems see infra notes 69–75. 
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equivalent of the CO2 emissions standards approach by using a 
combination of federally enforceable standards and elements that 
would be enforceable only under state laws.48 No matter what type 
of plan a state chooses, the desired result is to meet the emissions 
goals created for that state by the EPA. 
To generate state emissions goals under the Clean Power Plan 
final rule, the EPA first established CO2 emission performance 
standards for two subcategories of affected EGUs: (1) coal and oil-
fired power plants, and (2) natural gas combined cycle power 
plants.49 Second, the EPA divided the states into three regions and 
compiled 2012 data of CO2 emissions and electricity generation 
from each affected source in each state.50 Third, using the final 
rule’s three building blocks, the EPA calculated annual emission 
rates for each type of affected EGU in each of the three regions.51 
Finally, the EPA generated state-specific interim emissions goals 
and final emissions goals by applying the annual performance rates 
for each type of EGU to each state’s 2012 baseline fossil fuel 
generation mix.52 
The EPA represented each state’s emissions goals in three 
different forms: (1) rate-based goals measured in pounds per 
megawatt-hour (lbs/MWh)53, (2) mass-based goals measured in 
                                                
 48 See id. (providing that examples of measures only enforceable under state 
laws are renewable energy and/or energy efficiency requirements that could be 
applied to affected EGUs or other entities within the state); see also Clean 
Power Plan – Technical Summary for States, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/technical-summary-for-states.pdf. 
 49 See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 5. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. For examples of state goals, see Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra 
note 5, at 64961–64 (providing the three different formats of emissions goals for 
each state. One example is North Carolina, which has an interim emissions rate 
goal of 1,311 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour and a final emissions rate goal 
of 1,136 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour). 
 53 See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 5 (discussing that the typical 
rate target for emissions is measured in pounds (of CO2 in this case) released 
from the smokestacks per each megawatt-hour of electricity generation). 
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total short tons of CO254, and (3) mass-based goals with a new 
source complement55 measured in short tons of CO2.56 Using these 
goals, states then develop and submit customized SIPs that ensure 
power plants in their state achieve their interim and final goals.57 
The interim goals must be achieved on average over the eight-year 
period of 2022 to 2029.58 In addition, the EPA requires states to 
demonstrate their progress of implementing a gradual application 
of the best system of emission reduction with “glide paths” that 
states identify for reduction over three time periods: 2022–24, 
2025–27, and 2028–29.59 Furthermore, states must fully achieve 
their final goals by 2030.60 However, even though states are not 
officially required to take action until 2022, the EPA created a new 
program, the Clean Energy Incentive Program, to “reward early 
investments in renewable energy (RE) generation and demand side 
energy efficiency (EE) measures . . . during 2020 and/or 2021.”61 
The Clean Power Plan gives states great flexibility in selecting 
which compliance options they prefer to use to meet their 
emissions goals.62 Examples of these various compliance options 
                                                
 54 See id. The EPA used the state-specific emission rate targets to calculate 
equivalent state-specific mass-based targets, which are measured in metric tons 
of CO2. Id. Although EPA’s emission rates are in pounds per megawatt-hour, 
most national and international measures of CO2 emissions are provided in 
metric tons. One metric ton is approximately 2,205 pounds.” Id. 
 55 See New Source Complements to Mass Goals Technical Support Document 
for CPP Final Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 2015), 
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/tsd-cpp-new-source-complements.pdf#_ga= 
1.15399349.225111521.1440261320 (explaining that the mass-based goals with 
new source complements represent the EPA’s estimated new source emissions 
associated with satisfying incremental demand from 2012). 
 56 See FACT SHEET: Components of the Clean Power Plan: Setting State 
Goals to Cut Carbon Pollution, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-components-clean-power-plan 
(last updated Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter FACT SHEET: Components]. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 3. 
 59 See id. 
 60 See FACT SHEET: Components, supra note 56. 
 61 See Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 9. 
 62 See FACT SHEET: Components, supra note 56. 
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include: retiring older coal-fired power plants, switching to natural 
gas combined cycle power plants, incorporating more renewables, 
incorporating other non-emitting sources such as nuclear and 
hydropower, decreasing energy demand by taking measures to 
increase energy efficiency, and participating in an emissions 
trading program.63 
According to the EPA, emissions trading, through which 
affected power plants may meet their emissions standards via 
emission rate credits (for a rate-based standard) or allowances (for 
a mass-based standard), is arguably the most cost-effective method 
states can use to meet their goals.64 However, emissions trading, by 
itself, provides several different compliance options. States can 
engage in emissions trading through formal multistate agreements 
within multistate SIPs, or by creating a single-state SIP that is 
“trading-ready.”65 A SIP is “trading-ready” if it provides an EPA-
approved, or EPA-administered, credit/allowance tracking system 
and indicates that it would recognize for compliance any emission 
credit/allowance issued by another state.66 Furthermore, the EPA’s 
federal implementation plan, the plan states must adopt if the EPA 
rejects their individual SIP, is based on a federal CO2 cap and trade 
program.67 Therefore, the concept of emissions trading is prevalent 
in a variety of manners and areas under the EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan final rule. The specifics of emissions trading are discussed in 
the following section. 
                                                
 63 See generally Ramseur & McCarthy, supra note 37, at 9 (discussing all of 
the potential compliance options states can take under the Clean Power Plan). 
 64 See FACT SHEET: Components, supra note 56. 
 65 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64735. Multistate plans 
must explicitly identify partner states that can interact while trading. Id. 
 66 See id. at 64839. 
 67 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FEDERAL PLAN REQUIREMENTS 
FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS 
CONSTRUCTED ON OR BEFORE JANUARY 8, 2014; MODEL TRADING RULES; 
AMENDMENTS TO FRAMEWORK (2015),  http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/cpp 
-proposed-federal-plan.pdf (explaining that the proposed federal implementation 
plan is based on rate- and mass-based emissions trading programs). 
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C.  CO2 Emissions Trading 
Emissions trading is a proven approach to address air 
pollution.68 According to the EPA, “[e]mission trading is a market-
based policy tool that creates a financial incentive to reduce 
emissions where the costs of doing so are the lowest and clean 
energy investment enjoys the highest leverage.”69 Environmental 
market-based policy tools are regulations that encourage 
appropriate environmental behavior through price signals rather 
than through implicit instructions.70 In the Clean Power Plan’s 
case, it is simply the act of setting prices on an instrument 
representing a certain amount of reduced emissions, and the 
process of buying and selling those instruments through an 
economic market. The financial incentive generated through 
emissions trading is the potential for an EGU to generate excess 
income by reducing its own emissions, either at fossil fuel-fired 
plants or by using renewables, and selling the right to emit those 
emissions to another EGU on the market. 
Trading provides an EGU with alternatives to direct 
implementation of emission reduction measures in its own facility 
when lower-cost emission reduction opportunities exist 
                                                
 68 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CAP AND TRADE: ACID RAIN PROGRAM 
RESULTS (2002), http://www3.epa.gov/captrade/documents/ctresults.pdf (stating 
that the acid rain emissions trading program created a 9% reduction in harmful 
sulfur dioxide emissions in 2002 from 2000 and a 41% reduction from 1980 
levels. Furthermore the trading program created a 13% reduction in harmful 
nitrogen oxide emissions in 2002 from 2000, and a 33% decline from 1990 
levels); RGGI Benefits, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (2015), 
http://www.rggi.org/rggi_benefits (stating that emissions trading under RGGI 
has avoided 1.3 million short tons of CO2 through 2013, and is projected to 
avoid 10.3 million short tons of CO2 throughout its lifetime). 
 69 See FACT SHEET: Components, supra note 56. 
 70 See Robert Stavins & Bradley Whitehead, Market-Based Environmental 
Policies, from Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty, Eds., Thinking 
Ecologically, The Next Generation of Environmental Policy, YALE UNIVERSITY 
PRESS (1997), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/stavins/files/market_ 
based_environmental_policies.pdf (defining and discussing market-based policy 
tools in an environmental context). 
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elsewhere.71 The plan gives states the option to generate emissions 
rate credits, or allowances, based on whether they choose rate- or 
mass-based emissions goals.72 An EGU that exceeds its emissions 
goals will generate credits or allowances to sell, while an EGU that 
fails to meet its goals can correct its short-coming by purchasing 
credits or allowances from states that surpass compliance goals.73 
The states must incorporate and define, within their SIPs, the value 
of an emission credit/allowance.74 Although implementing an 
emissions trading program seems like a logical choice for state 
compliance, many states and organizations are challenging its 
legality of under the Clean Power Plan.75 
III. LEGALITY AND IMPORTANCE OF CO2 EMISSIONS 
TRADING FOR STATE COMPLIANCE 
Opponents to CO2 emissions trading first argue that it falls 
outside the scope of CAA section 111(d). Critics of the plan insist 
that section 111(d) only authorizes “inside-the-fenceline” 
approaches to emissions reductions and does not allow “outside-
the-fenceline” approaches.76 “Inside-the-fenceline” approaches, 
such as building block one,77 are emissions-cutting actions that the 
                                                
 71 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64735. 
 72 See id. at 64734–35. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. Usually a credit/allowance is equal to one ton of the pollutant 
emitted, therefore it could be equal to one ton of CO2 under the Clean Power 
Plan. 
 75 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee et. al., The Clean Power Plan: Issues to 
Watch, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM at 11, 57–58 (Aug. 2015), 
http://progressivereform.org/articles/CPP_1506.pdf (acknowledging that 
emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan will be a legal issue, but arguing 
in support of an emissions trading program); Nathan Richardson, A Quick Legal 
FAQ on EPA’s Clean Power Plan, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (July 14, 
2015), http://www.rff.org/blog/2015/quick-legal-faq-epa-s-clean-power-plan 
(stating that the emissions trading is one of the four main legal risks of the Clean 
Power Plan). 
 76 See Richardson, supra note 11. 
 77 For further discussion on the BSER and building block 1 see supra notes 
27–40. 
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actual facilities being regulated, existing power plants, can take.78 
In contrast, “outside-the-fenceline” approaches include emissions-
cutting actions through sources other than existing power plants, 
including renewables, nuclear, energy efficiency, or by substituting 
less polluting power generation through emissions trading.79 This 
differentiation between “inside-the-fenceline” and “outside-the-
fenceline” approaches is important to opponents of the Clean 
Power Plan because they suggest the Plan includes “outside-the-
fenceline” approaches, and if section 111(d) is found to exclude 
these measures then they could succeed in having the plan struck 
down in court. However, all of the compliance measures within the 
Clean Power Plan are arguably “inside-the-fenceline” because 
even if measures are implemented through sources other than the 
actual affected sources, these measures should still result in 
reducing emissions from the actual affected EGUs. Therefore, the 
end result of any approach under the Clean Power Plan would 
succeed as an “inside-the-fenceline” approach. However, for 
purposes of this Recent Development, the targeted approach is 
emissions trading. 
Focusing on emissions trading, critics argue that section 111(d) 
does not authorize emissions trading, but other parts of the CAA 
do, therefore trading under section 111(d) should not be an 
option.80 An example of this can be found within section 112(d)(2), 
which notes that emission reduction may be achieved “through 
application of measures, processes, methods, systems or techniques 
including, but not limited to, measures which . . . .”81 Section 112 
                                                
 78 See Richardson, supra note 11. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See, e.g., Robert R. Nordhaus & Ilan W. Gutherz, Regulation of CO2 
Emissions From Existing Power Plants Under § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: 
Program Design and Statutory Authority, EVNTL. L. REP. (2014), 
https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/docs/article_2014_04_44.10366.pdf 
(discussing the differences between Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act and 
other sections that explicitly allow emissions trading); Richardson, supra note 
11 (pointing out that section 111(d) does not explicitly allow emissions trading). 
 81 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2015). 
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goes on to describe measures which generally reduce emissions.82 
Even though emissions trading is not explicitly stated as an option, 
Section 112 authorizes it by stating that allowable options are not 
limited to the measures discussed therein, and emissions trading 
has consistently been proven to reduce emissions overall.83 
As discussed above, section 111(d) only discusses creating 
standards of performance for existing sources to regulate certain 
pollutants, in this case CO2, and therefore, does not explicitly 
allow or suggest any type of trading.84 Notably, section 111(d) does 
not expressly forbid trading either.85 Opponents of the Clean Power 
Plan are attempting to act upon this legal ambiguity. However, 
under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,86 if a statute is ambiguous courts defer to the administrative 
agency’s interpretation, as long as its interpretation is reasonable.87 
Chevron revolutionized the process by which courts defer to 
administrative agencies when dealing with questions of statutory 
interpretation.88 The issue in Chevron was the definition of the 
term “stationary source” within the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).89 The 
CAA required states in nonattainment under the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) to establish a permitting 
program regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of 
air pollution.90 The EPA regulation promulgated to implement this 
permit requirement allowed states to adopt a plant-wide definition 
of the term “stationary source.”91 This plant-wide definition was 
                                                
 82 See id. 
 83 For further detail, see supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 84 See generally supra notes 20–26, see also 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015). 
 85 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015); see also Richardson, supra note 
11. 
 86 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
 87 Id. at 866 (holding that EPA’s definition of the term “source” is reasonable 
and a permissible construction of the statute because the statute is ambiguous 
and EPA is the expert on the subject matter). 
 88 See generally id. 
 89 See id. at 840. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See id. 
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known as the “bubble policy” and allowed states to treat all 
pollution emitting structures within the same facility as one 
“stationary source.”92 The question at issue was whether EPA’s 
“bubble policy” definition was based on a reasonable construction 
of the CAA’s statutory term “stationary source.”93 The Supreme 
Court held in favor of the EPA, deciding that the EPA’s definition 
was a permissible construction of the statute because it furthered 
the goal of the CAA which sought to promote progress in reducing 
air pollution along with economic growth.94 Chevron created a test 
that whenever Congress has not directly spoken to the precise legal 
question at issue, the statute is ambiguous. The court will defer to 
the agency’s interpretation as long as it is a permissible 
construction of the statute.95 
Applying Chevron to the CAA, Congress has not spoken to the 
precise legal question of emissions trading within section 111(d), 
and the EPA’s interpretation that section 111(d) allows CO2 
emissions trading should be found to be a reasonable, permissible 
construction of the statute. Similar to the court’s conclusion in 
Chevron, allowing emissions trading under section 111(d) will 
further the CAA’s overall goal of reducing air pollution while 
spurring economic growth. The legality of emissions trading can 
be supported through several long-standing CAA regulations 
incorporating trading, and the legal precedents upholding those 
CAA regulations. These regulations include: (A) the Title IV Acid 
Rain Program; and (B) the EPA’s pollution transport rulemakings. 
The EPA’s pollution transport rulemakings under subsection (B) 
include: (1) the call for nitrogen oxide state implementation plans, 
and (2) the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule. 
A.  Title IV Acid Rain Program 
The Acid Rain Program provides strong legislative support for 
upholding emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan. In 
                                                
 92 See id. 
 93 See id. 
 94 See id. at 866. 
 95 Id. 
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response to acid rain studies96 and improved emissions modeling97, 
the EPA established the Acid Rain Program under Title IV of the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.98 The Acid Rain Program was 
the first national cap and trade program in the country, and it 
introduced a system of allowance trading that uses market-based 
incentives to reduce nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) and sulfur dioxide 
(“SO2”) pollution.99 The program allocated each utility a number of 
emissions allowances in proportion to their historical percentages 
of total emissions, with the total number of allowances limited to 
the capped levels.100 In addition to the specifics of the program 
under Title IV, Title V implements the provisions of the Acid Rain 
Program through a permitting process.101 Similar to the Clean 
Power Plan, each permit application must include a compliance 
plan for the affected source that details how that source will meet 
the Title IV requirements.102 Furthermore, the utilities under the 
Acid Rain Program have the flexibility to choose among several 
options to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions, such as adding 
emissions controls, replacing existing controls with more advanced 
technologies, optimizing existing controls, switching fuels, using 
banked allowances, or buying allowances from the market.103 
                                                
 96 See generally CAP AND TRADE: ACID RAIN PROGRAM RESULTS, supra note 
68. (discussing that the studies of acid rain and its impacts on human health and 
the environment led to the CAA amendments to address the acid rain caused by 
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides). 
 97 As the level of technology increased, experts could study and record more 
accurate levels of pollutants in the atmosphere and the harm they were causing 
by using improved computer modeling. 
 98 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2015) (the main section amended in the 
1990 amendments); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Acid Rain Program, 
(Sept. 25, 2015), http://www2.epa.gov/airmarkets/acid-rain-program. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Richard N. L. Andrews, State Environmental Policy Innovations: North 
Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act, 43 ENVTL. L. 881, 884 (2013). 
 101 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2015); see also Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra 
note 5, at 64696. 
 102 See id. 
 103 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Acid Rain Program Market Based 
Mechanisms, (2015), http://www2.epa.gov/airmarkets/acid-rain-program-
market-based-mechanisms. 
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Therefore, the only clear distinction between the Acid Rain 
Program and the Clean Power Plan is the pollutant being regulated, 
NOx and SO2 versus CO2, respectively. 
B.  Pollution Transport Rulemakings 
In addition to the Acid Rain Program, the EPA’s pollution 
transport rulemakings also provide legislative support for 
upholding emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan. Section 
110 of the CAA applies to SIPs for NAAQS.104 Section 110’s 
“Good Neighbor Provision” requires SIPs to prohibit emissions 
that contribute significantly to nonattainment or interferes with 
other states’ NAAQS attainment.105 Similar to the Clean Power 
Plan, section 110 also provides that the EPA must issue a federal 
implementation plan, when a SIP is denied, but in this case it is to 
prohibit the “Good Neighbor Provision’s” emissions “at any time” 
within the next two years.106 Two major EPA transport rulemakings 
support emissions trading: (1) the NOx SIP Call, and (2) the Cross-
State Air Pollution Rule. 
1.  NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call 
In 1998, the EPA issued the NOx SIP Call,107 which required 
several states upwind of affected states to reduce emissions of NOx 
that would drift and impact downwind states with ozone 
problems.108 The EPA set emission reduction requirements based 
on reductions achievable through “highly cost-effective” measures, 
similar to the EPA setting building blocks under the BSER of the 
Clean Power Plan.109 Next, the EPA determined that a uniform 
emission rate on large EGUs along with a cap-and-trade program 
                                                
 104 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2015). 
 105 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64696. 
 106 See id. 
 107 Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in 
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing 
Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57354 (Oct. 27, 1998). This is the 
rule known as the NOx SIP Call. 
 108 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64696. 
 109 See id. 
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was an option available as a “highly cost-effective” measure.110 
With that determination, the EPA created the NOx Budget Trading 
Program.111 The D.C. Circuit in Michigan v. EPA112 upheld the NOx 
SIP Call’s trading program, creating yet another legal precedent 
supporting emissions trading.113 
Michigan v. EPA addressed the EPA’s promulgation of 
NAAQS for air pollutants, which states must implement, maintain, 
and enforce through SIPs.114 The EPA issued a final rule, the NOx 
SIP Call, which called for states to revise their SIPs to mitigate 
interstate transport of the ozone precursor, NOx, because the 
emissions from some states were negatively affecting other states 
that were downwind of the emissions.115 Several upwind states 
petitioned the rule.116 The Supreme Court held in favor of the 
petitioning states because it found that the EPA failed to 
demonstrate that the states contributed significantly to the 
nonattainment of acceptable NOx emissions in downwind states.117 
However, the Court upheld the provisions of the NOx SIP Call, 
such as its emissions trading program, because the EPA’s scheme 
for uniform controls regarding NOx emissions were not arbitrary 
and capricious.118 Thus, the holding of Michigan v. EPA supports 
upholding emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan because 
the EPA’s intentions behind emissions trading advance the CAA’s 
goals of reducing air pollution, and those intentions do not meet 
the standard of arbitrary and capricious. 
                                                
 110 See id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 113 Id. at 688 (holding that EPA’s NOx budget trading program reasonably 
established reduction levels and leaves the control measure selection decision to 
the states). 
 114 See id. at 669. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. at 688. 
 118 See id. 
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2.  Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
Similar to the NOx SIP Call, the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
reinforces the legality of emissions trading under the Clean Power 
Plan. Prior to the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (“CSAPR”), the 
EPA created the Clean Air Interstate Rule (“CAIR”) in 2005.119 
CAIR was very similar to the NOx SIP Call, except it required 
upwind states to reduce NOx and SO2 emissions to protect 
downwind states from negative impacts.120 Emission reduction 
requirements were determined based on known cost-effective 
controls for EGUs.121 As with the NOx SIP Call, the EPA also 
established a cap-and-trade program for sources of NOx and SO2 in 
states that chose to participate in emissions trading within their 
SIPs and for states ultimately subject to a federal implementation 
plan.122 However, the D.C. Circuit remanded CAIR in North 
Carolina v. EPA123 because it found the cost-effective standard of 
the trading program to be unlawful.124 North Carolina v. EPA 
examined CAIR’s failure to describe how its trading program 
would achieve the goals of not contributing to the nonattainment of 
downwind states when each upwind state’s contribution to another 
state was unknown.125 Although the case was remanded, the Court 
kept CAIR in place until the EPA could develop an acceptable 
substitute because the concept behind the program was legal, just 
not the proposed structure of the trading program.126 
As a result of this ruling, the EPA introduced CSAPR in 2011 
as the substitute for CAIR.127 CSAPR had the same purpose as 
CAIR, and simply fixed the EPA’s original application of the cost-
                                                
 119 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64696. 
 120 See id. 
 121 See id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 124 Id. at 930 (holding that CAIR’s trading program was unlawful because it 
did not connect states’ emissions reductions to any measure of their own 
significant contributions). 
 125 See id. at 901–02. 
 126 See id. 
 127 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64696–97. 
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effective standard. Under CSAPR, the EPA determined the 
emission reduction requirements based on reductions available at 
certain cost thresholds by EGUs in each state.128 The EPA also 
issued federal implementation plans that subjected states to 
emissions trading programs to achieve reductions.129 The Supreme 
Court in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.130 upheld the 
EPA’s application of cost to set emission reduction requirements, 
as well as the EPA’s authority to issue federal implementation 
plans with emissions trading programs.131 The Court analyzed the 
factors the EPA must consider when determining an upwind state’s 
contribution to the nonattainment of downwind states.132 The Court 
of Appeals had held that the CAA required the EPA to only 
consider each upwind state’s physically proportionate 
responsibility for each downwind state’s air quality problem 
without consideration of cost.133 The Supreme Court disagreed and 
upheld the EPA’s consideration of cost in emissions trading as a 
permissible construction of the statute.134 This holding created yet 
another legal precedent supporting emissions trading under the 
Clean Power Plan. 
In conclusion, CO2 emissions trading is a legal and important 
aspect of the Clean Power Plan. The legality of emissions trading 
under the Clean Power Plan is legislatively supported by the Title 
IV Acid Rain Program, the NOx SIP Call, and the Cross-State Air 
Pollution Rule. Furthermore, the legality of emissions trading 
under the Clean Power Plan is supported by a plethora of case law, 
including Chevron, Michigan v. EPA, and EME Homer. Therefore, 
                                                
 128 See id. 
 129 See id. 
 130 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
 131 Id. at 1610 (holding that the Good Neighbor Provision of the CAA does 
not require EPA to disregard costs, and that EPA’s cost-effective allocation of 
emissions reductions among upwind states through federal implementation plans 
with trading programs is a permissible, workable, and equitable interpretation of 
the CAA). 
 132 See id. at 1593. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See id. at 1610. 
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the Clean Power Plan should be upheld with respect to the legality 
of emissions trading. 
IV.  EMISSIONS TRADING WITHOUT STATE LEGISLATION: A 
LOOK AT NORTH CAROLINA 
Opponents to CO2 emissions trading argue that states cannot 
implement a CO2 emissions trading program without obtaining 
authorization by each state’s general assembly.135 In particular, 
opponents allege that state general assemblies must specifically 
authorize the use of emissions trading in Clean Power Plan SIPs.136 
However, unless a state has already passed legislation explicitly 
prohibiting a CO2 emissions trading program, there is no legal 
basis to deny a state from including emissions trading in their SIP 
under the Clean Power Plan. This is because, as discussed above, 
several statutes, regulations, and cases exist that support the 
legality of emissions trading programs.137 An analysis of North 
Carolina’s legislative history provides a foundation for why North 
Carolina, and other states, can legally establish interstate trading 
programs for CO2 emissions without authorization from their 
general assemblies. 
Interstate trading of CO2 emissions will likely be legal in North 
Carolina without authorization from the General Assembly. 
Currently, there is no North Carolina statute explicitly prohibiting 
                                                
 135 See, e.g., Craig Gannett, Implementing Section 111(D) of the Clean Air Act: 
The Pathway to Regional Cap-And-Trade Programs?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. 
FOUND. SPECIAL INST. ON CLIMATE CHANGE L. & REG. 12 (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://www.dwt.com/files/Publication/564b041d-5bbe-4167-b8e6-c17233b67198/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/85c4e92a-492b-4de7-9144-c1bfd55a6f0b/Ga 
nnett%20Regional%20Cap%20%20Trade%20Paper%201-15.pdf (suggesting the 
need for state legislation authorizing the participation in a regional emissions 
trading organization); Multistate Coordination Resources for Clean Power Plan 
Compliance: Sample Documents for Consideration, THE NAT’L ASS’N. OF REG. 
UTIL. COMMISSIONERS 19 (June 2015), http://www.naruc.org/Grants/Documents/ 
Multistate%20111d-Coordination-FINAL%20_June2015.pdf (stating that a 
common theme among opposing states is that authorizing state legislation is 
necessary for state plans, or parts thereof, such as an emissions trading program). 
 136 Id. 
 137 For more detail see supra notes 97–136. 
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the implementation of a CO2 emissions trading program. In fact, 
there are several provisions within North Carolina’s general 
statutes and administrative code that support the legality of 
implementing a CO2 emissions trading program.138 As discussed 
below, the legality of a trading system is supported through: (A) 
North Carolina statutes and regulations on air quality standards and 
classifications, and (B) existing state restrictions on trading for air 
quality. Subsection (B) is further divided into: (1) The Clean Air 
Act’s acid rain cap and trade program, and (2) the North Carolina 
Clean Smokestacks Act.139 
A.  North Carolina statutes and regulations on air quality 
In adopting state law to implement the CAA, the North 
Carolina General Assembly directed the Environmental 
Management Commission, “[t]o develop and adopt standards and 
plans necessary to implement requirements of the federal Clean 
Air Act and implement[] regulations adopted by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency.”140 The purpose of the EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan is to enforce new emissions standards under 
section 111(d) of the federal CAA. Therefore, the North Carolina 
Environmental Management Commission, as part of the North 
Carolina Department of Environment Quality (“DEQ”), has the 
authority, and is required to adopt a SIP to meet the emissions 
requirements laid out in the final federal Clean Power Plan. Since 
the federal rule presents a trading option,141 The DEQ should be 
able to legally implement a trading system without authorization 
from the North Carolina General Assembly. 
This is not the first time DEQ has acted to implement an EPA 
policy without authorization from the N.C. General Assembly. In 
adopting state law to implement the CAA NAAQS, the North 
Carolina General Assembly also directed the Environmental 
                                                
 138 See, e.g., Improve Air Quality/Electric Utilities, N.C. Sess. Laws 2002–4, 
S.B. 1078 § 1(i) [hereinafter The Clean Smokestacks Act]; N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 143-215.107(a)(10) (2014); 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2D.2408(a) (2015). 
 139 See The Clean Smokestacks Act, supra note 138. 
 140 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107(a)(10) (2014). 
 141 See generally Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5. 
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Management Commission to develop and adopt a program of 
incentives to promote voluntary emissions reductions, suggesting 
an emissions trading program.142 The Clean Power Plan offers an 
emissions banking, trading, and credit program as a valid 
compliance option.143 Nothing in current state law prevents North 
Carolina from implementing a trading program, therefore, DEQ 
will be authorized to implement a trading program for CO2 
emissions credits into North Carolina’s SIP under the Clean Power 
Plan. 
Though a trading system is not necessarily required by the 
Clean Power Plan, a compliance plan is necessary, and a trading 
program is a valid compliance option for the plan.144 In addition, 
even though the initial reduction of emissions will not be 
voluntary, some EGUs may choose to voluntarily reduce emissions 
further in order to receive allowances and participate in a trading 
program.145 By doing this, EGUs can increase revenue while 
reducing regulatory costs.146 
Regulations within North Carolina’s Administrative Code also 
support transfers of emissions allowances for NOx, SO2, and ozone 
season NOx to comply with legislation enforcing the standards 
required under Title IV of the Clean Air Act. These regulations 
apply to all North Carolina CAIR NOx units, CAIR SO2 units, and 
CAIR NOx ozone season units that are subject to the NOx, SO2, 
and NOx ozone season trading programs, respectively, unless they 
                                                
 142 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.107(a)(12) (2014) (directing the 
Environmental Management Commission “[t]o develop and adopt a program of 
incentives to promote voluntary reductions of emissions of air contaminants, 
including, but not limited to, emissions banking and trading and credit for 
voluntary early reduction of emissions”). 
 143 See Clean Power Plan Final Rule, supra note 5, at 64733. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See id. 
 146 See Jonas Monast, Tim Profeta, Jeremy Tarr & Brian Murray, Enhancing 
Compliance Flexibility under the Clean Power Plan: A Common Elements 
Approach to Capturing Low-Cost Emissions Reductions, Nicholas Institute for 
Environmental Policy Solutions 1 (March 2015), 
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_15-01.pdf. 
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fall into the category of “investor-owned public utilities” regulated 
by the Clean Smokestacks Act.147 
In implementing state legislation, North Carolina regulations 
provide that the EPA shall administer the allowance tracking 
program.148 Furthermore, the regulations provide that the owners 
and operators of each emitting source shall have a compliance 
account in the EPA administered tracking system that satisfies the 
NOx, SO2, and ozone season NOx requirements laid out in the 
Code of Federal Regulations.149 Lastly, the regulations provide that 
any person may apply to open a general account to hold and 
transfer allowances and any person who has a compliance account 
or general account may bank allowances for future use or 
transfer.150 In simpler terms, these regulations state that North 
Carolina sources emitting NOx, SO2, and ozone season NOx can 
have accounts, administered by the EPA, in which they can buy, 
sell, bank, and transfer emission allowances. Therefore, any unit 
that is not required to transfer emissions allowances to the State is 
allowed to transfer emissions as per the regulations discussed 
above. 
B.  Existing State Restrictions on Trading for Air Quality 
In addition to North Carolina statutes and regulations on air 
quality, existing North Carolina restrictions on trading for air 
quality also support emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan 
without authorization from the North Carolina General Assembly. 
Some state legislation placed certain limits on trading by requiring 
actual emission reductions through emission controls. The legality 
of emissions trading under the Clean Power Plan is supported 
through existing state restrictions on trading for air quality sparked 
from: (1) the Acid Rain Cap & Trade Program, and (2) The North 
Carolina Clean Smokestacks Act. 
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§ 143-215.107D(i) (2014). 
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1.  Acid Rain Cap & Trade Program 
As discussed above, the Acid Rain Program was established 
under Title IV of the 1990 CAA Amendments.151 The Acid Rain 
Program’s (“ARP”) cap and trade system allows EGUs to buy and 
sell allowances to meet compliance.152 However, during at least the 
first five years of the ARP, North Carolina was among the major 
net importers of emissions allowances, continuing to pollute while 
purchasing allowances rather than cleaning up emissions to sell 
allowances to others.153 This continued until 2002, when North 
Carolina passed the Clean Smokestacks Act. Therefore, the Acid 
Rain Program establishes precedent for emissions trading within 
North Carolina without authorization from the General Assembly. 
2.  The North Carolina Clean Smokestacks Act 
North Carolina law does not per se prohibit interstate 
emissions allowance trading. The Clean Smokestacks Act is the 
single example of North Carolina legislation explicitly prohibiting 
one form of interstate emissions allowance trading due to a range 
of factors.154 
North Carolina’s air quality was an increasingly significant 
concern by the late 1990s, with more than half of the electric 
power generated by forty-five coal-fired units, nearly all built in 
the 1970s or earlier.155 In 1999, North Carolina experienced sixty-
eight unhealthy air days, ranking it fifth in the country.156 
Furthermore, smog in North Carolina during April through 
October 1997 was estimated to have caused 19,000 respiratory-
related hospital admissions, 5,700 respiratory visits to emergency 
rooms, and 240,000 asthma attacks.157 
                                                
 151 See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
 152 See id. 
 153 See Richard N. L. Andrews, State Environmental Policy Innovations: 
North Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act, 43 ENVTL. L. 881, 885 (2013). 
 154 See generally The Clean Smokestacks Act, supra note 138 (prohibiting 
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During public hearings in 2000, regarding rules for complying 
with the EPA’s NOx SIP Call, the public of North Carolina showed 
vigorous support for state action, resulting in state legislators 
proposing language for more far reaching pollution reduction.158 
The original proposal identified the pre-1977 power plants as the 
dominant sources of SO2 and mercury, and nearly half the NOx 
emissions in the state.159 The plan also documented proven 
emission control technologies that could dramatically reduce these 
emissions.160 The Senate examined the first version of the Clean 
Smokestacks bill on April 1, 2001.161 After many debates and 
several amendments to the bill, Congress passed the final version 
of the Clean Smokestacks Act in June of 2002.162 
The Clean Smokestacks Act requires power companies within 
North Carolina to reduce their smog- and haze-forming emissions 
by approximately three-fourths over the next decade.163 Under the 
act, coal-fired power plants must achieve a 77-percent cut in NOx 
emissions by 2009 and a 73-percent cut in SO2 emissions by 
2013.164 Therefore, the Clean Smokestacks Act had the same, if not 
stricter, goals as the Acid Rain Program. The significant difference 
is that, under the Clean Smokestacks Act, North Carolina’s two 
largest investor-owned utility companies, Duke Power Company 
and Progress Energy Corporation (now together Duke Energy), 
must achieve these emissions cuts through actual reductions at 
their 14 power plants within the state—not by buying or trading 
emissions allowances from utilities in other states, as allowed 
under federal regulations.165 The State wanted emissions reductions 
over trading to ensure that utilities in neighboring states did not 
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negate the gains achieved in North Carolina by purchasing the 
rights to increase or avoid controlling their own emissions.166 
The Act did not allow the utilities to sell emissions allowances, 
but instead required the two utilities to formally sign over their 
emissions allowances to the State.167 “The State Treasurer shall 
hold emissions allowances that are transferred to the State . . . in 
trust for the people of this State and shall sell, trade, transfer, or 
otherwise dispose of the emissions allowances only as the General 
Assembly shall provide by law.”168 So far, the General Assembly 
has remained silent on the State’s uses of these emissions 
allowances. Therefore, the Clean Smokestacks Act became 
legislation that explicitly prohibited North Carolina’s participation 
in a trading market for NOx and SO2 emissions allowances. 
Currently, North Carolinians are breathing cleaner air today 
than any time in decades.169 Harmful emissions from coal-fired 
power plants operating in North Carolina have been drastically cut 
following the passage of the NC Clean Smokestacks Act in 
2002.170 Equipped with 21st century control technology, North 
Carolina’s power plants are among the most efficient and least 
polluting coal fleet in the nation.171 The urgency to reduce in-state 
emissions is not as prevalent as before the Clean Smokestacks Act 
was passed. Additionally, it is not likely that North Carolina would 
address CO2 the same way it did SO2 and NOx, because CO2 poses 
a global threat while the other two pollutants generally cause 
problems on a regional basis.172 Furthermore, North Carolina’s 
participation in a CO2 trading system could potentially be a cost-
efficient option to help further reduce CO2 emissions. Therefore, 
there is no reason to prevent the implementation of an emissions 
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allowance trading system in North Carolina. In conclusion, a CO2 
emissions trading program should be legal in North Carolina, 
unless the North Carolina General Assembly were to pass similar 
legislation applying the Clean Smokestacks Act to CO2 emissions. 
This North Carolina case study illustrates that precedent exists 
for states engaging in emissions trading programs without explicit 
authorization from their general assemblies. As long as states do 
not have existing legislation similar to North Carolina’s Clean 
Smokestacks Act they will not face legal issues by including an 
emissions trading program within their Clean Power Plan SIP. 
Simplifying matters further, even if states had legislation similar to 
North Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act, they would only bar a 
Clean Power Plan trading program if they explicitly prohibited 
CO2 emissions trading. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Clean Power Plan is an expansive regulation taking 
historic and important action on climate change, one of the greatest 
environmental and public health challenges we face.173 This costly 
plan affects the entire electricity sector across the United States as 
a whole, yet will yield billions of dollars in significant benefits 
over time.174 Emissions trading can significantly lower state 
compliance costs, while at the same time promoting cheaper 
cleaner energy alternatives to traditional burning of fossil fuels.175 
Among the many legal challenges the Clean Power Plan will 
face in court, the legality of emissions trading seems to be one of 
                                                
 173 See generally FACT SHEET: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-
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the most unreasonable. Courts should not find emissions trading 
under the plan to be illegal on the basis of ambiguity and lack of 
explicit approval in CAA section 111(d). Furthermore, emissions 
trading is supported by several regulations and other legislation 
that have all been upheld by the courts; several by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Lastly, state general assembly authorization 
should not be required for inclusion of emissions trading within 
Clean Power Plan SIPs. Analysis of North Carolina’s legislative 
history reveals that it is possible for states to engage in emissions 
trading without explicit authorization by state legislatures. 
Emissions trading is a legal, cost-efficient method of controlling 
certain types of air pollution, and there is no reason it should be 
deemed illegal when it comes to CO2. 
